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Institutionalist and Methodological Perspectives  
on Law – Contributions of the  
Economics of Convention  
Rainer Diaz-Bone ∗ 
Abstract: »Institutionalistische und methodologische Perspektiven auf Recht – 
Beiträge der economics of convention«. The article presents in its first parts 
main concepts of the French approach of economics of convention (EC) and its 
main contributions to the analysis of (economic) law. EC represents an endoge-
nous perspective of law as an institution whose usage is embedded in situations 
wherein competent actors have to coordinate and develop a shared under-
standing of situations. EC conceives real situations as structured by coordinat-
ing actors and a plurality of logics of coordination, which are called conven-
tions in this approach. EC has contributed in some of its historical research 
studies on economic institutions to the analysis of (economic) law. In the sec-
ond part of this article, newer trends in EC are discussed which focus on discur-
sive practices and apply strategies of discourse analysis in the analysis of eco-
nomic institutions as labor law. It is claimed that EC can be regarded as a 
distinguished approach for the integration of discourse analytic perspectives 
into a complex pragmatic approach to political economy. 
Keywords: Economics of conventions, investment in forms, discourse, institu-
tionalism, collective cognitive dispositives, legal production, law, labor law, 
economic law. 
1.  Introduction1 
The French approach of the so-called “économie des conventions” (economics 
of convention, in short EC) has developed in the last three decades in the Paris 
region and nowadays represents one of the most important French contributions 
to the analysis of political economy.2 From its beginnings, it has included a 
                                                             
∗  Rainer Diaz-Bone, Department of Sociology, University of Lucerne, Frohburgstrasse 3, 6002 
Lucerne, Switzerland; rainer.diazbone@unilu.ch. 
1  I would like to thank Robert Salais and Claude Didry for discussion and comments. 
2  The main monographs are Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) and Storper and Salais (1997). 
Important French collections are Salais and Thévenot (1986), Salais, Chatel and Rivaut-
Danset (1998), Orléan (2004), Eymard-Duvernay (2006a, 2006b). English written collections 
are Favereau and Lazega (2002), Salais and Diaz-Bone (2011, 2012). German written collec-
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pragmatist and historical perspective in the analysis of institutions and conven-
tions. EC avoided separating the analysis of economies, organizations, markets 
and law, as many other approaches did. Today, EC is also one of the few interna-
tional exceptions for an integrating approach of the analysis of economy, its 
institutions and law.3 Another one is the Chicagoan “Law and economics” ap-
proach.4 From its beginning, EC also applied a complex pragmatic situationalism 
as its methodological position, focusing on competent actors who have to coordi-
nate in situations pursuing a collective goal and collective goods.  
Actors implicitly and – in case of conflict or reflexive communication – ex-
plicitly refer to conventions as logic of coordination (Boltanski and Thévenot 
2006). The notion of convention as elaborated by the EC approach therefore 
does not mean “standards” or “customs” (Diaz-Bone and Thévenot 2010). 
Instead, conventions are conceived as cultural frames of evaluation and coordi-
nation actors refer to when they have to build up shared framings of situations, 
events and objects. Conventions are the foundations for shared evaluations of 
quality and worth (in French grandeur). In real situations and in real institu-
tional settings EC assumes a pluralism of co-existing conventions actors can 
refer to (Storper and Salais 1997). Sometimes this pluralism provokes conflict, 
but in most everyday situations, actors have worked out compromises of these 
different conventions and these compromises are stabilized by their links to 
cognitive formats and objects (Thévenot 1984, 2006).5 
In this article, the genuine contributions of EC to the political economy of 
law are introduced. Thereby its specific methodological position – which could 
be labelled as complex pragmatic situationalism (Diaz-Bone 2011) – and its set 
of main concepts are engaged in the interpretation of law as an important institu-
tion for economic coordination. But this contribution will also argue that there are 
some developments within EC which prepare the inclusion of language and dis-
course analyses into this approach. Especially the concept of law production 
(Didry 2002, 2012) can be interpreted as a sphere where discursive practices are 
important for the development, implementation and interpretation of law.  
                                                                                                                                
tions are Diaz-Bone and Thévenot (2010), Diaz-Bone (2011). Shorter German introductions 
were published by Salais (2007) and Diaz-Bone (2009a, 2009b). 
3  Many representatives cooperated with French law scientists, as Antoine Lyon-Caen or Alain 
Supiot. See for example the report edited by Lyon-Caen and Affichard which is the result of 
one of these cooperations (Lyon-Caen and Affichard 2008). 
4  See the introduction of this volume for an evaluation of the Law and Economics-approach 
from the perspective of EC. 
5  And – it has to be added – in some situations actors cannot decide about conventions (Livet 
1994).  
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2.  Law from a Conventionalist Perspective 
Without law, no modern economy would be possible. Property rights, trade law, 
liability law, trade mark law, patent law, labor law, contract law enable actors to 
produce, possess and exchange economic products and services. EC starts with 
this evidence.6 But EC questions law as a constraint for economic action. And the 
representatives of EC regard law as an incomplete institution. There are some 
main – and interrelated – arguments brought in by representatives of EC.7 
2.1  Institutions (As Law) are Incomplete  
First written law is seen as an incomplete dispositive for the coordination of 
economic actions. Here, EC can draw on Durkheim’s argument of the social 
embeddedness of contracts and of social preconditions of the contract. Social 
order and social relations (social bonds) must be preexisting to make contracts 
possible – i.e. to rely on its fulfillment and the possibility of its enforcement: 
“The contract is not sufficient by itself, but is only possible because of the 
regulation of contracts, which is of social origin” (Durkheim 1984, 162). The 
conventionalist Bénédicte Reynaud has worked out in more detail the necessity 
of rules and contracts as institutional dispositives that have to be interpreted in 
situations (Reynaud 1987, 1988). Reynaud has criticized the concept of the 
firm as a system of labor contracts. For Reynaud, it is evident that this kind of 
contract cannot be reduced to a juridical rule because the fundamental uncer-
tainty remains: the uncertainty about the quality of labor (Reynaud 1987, 
1988). There is a time gap between the conclusion of the labor contract on the 
one hand, and the execution of the contract, which is the performance of the 
labor force in the firm on the other hand.8 Labor contracts are, in most cases, 
long-term agreements which cannot specify all the conditions and details in 
advance for the work to be done – unless the kind of labor is highly standard-
ized and its amount can be calculated and guaranteed for the long-term per-
spective. Therefore, the labor contract needs to be incomplete! Christian Bessy 
and François Eymard-Duvernay (1995) also systematically studied economists’ 
and law scientists’ approaches for the analysis of labor relations in firms. Both 
argue that the firm can be conceived as a dispositive for the enduring economic 
coordination of actors. For Bessy and Eymard-Duvernay, this long-term char-
acter is not appropriately grasped by economic and legal concepts of the con-
tract (Eymard-Duvernay 1988; Bessy and Eymard-Duvernay 1995). One rea-
                                                             
6  For property rights see the contributions of Bessy and Brousseau (1998), Brousseau and 
Bessy (2006). 
7  For a more detailed presentation see Diaz-Bone (forthcoming). 
8  See also the model of the interrelation between labor and its product in Salais (2011, 231) 
which is also presented in Salais (2007, 102). 
HSR 40 (2015) 1  │  26 
son for this is that conventions for the interpretation and for the practical man-
agement of the labor relations evolve over time between employers and em-
ployees. These conventions need not to be regulated in juridical terms or by 
labor law, because of the specifics of each situation and of each firm (Eymard-
Duvernay 1988, 545). In a similar vein, Olivier Favereau (1989, 1997) has 
developed an argument which is not in line with the Durkheimian tradition. He 
does not explain the incompleteness of the contract by referring to its foregoing 
social embeddedness (which “completes” the contract). Favereau instead refers 
to the firm as learning organization. Contracts and rules are the result of collec-
tive learning and they are used to mobilize the collective intentionality for 
coordination and – in forms – for production. For this, Favereau conceives 
rules and contracts as collective cognitive devices, because they are used by 
competent actors for their coordination. Labor contracts generalize this will-
ingness to cooperate in the collective coordination (Favereau 1989, 298). Or-
ganizational rules and contracts become objects and their incompleteness ena-
bles collective learning and they materialize collective learning processes. And, 
consequently, organizations are environments for these learning processes. 
Incompleteness of rules and contracts, for Olivier Favereau, is therefore “not 
the problem, but the solution” (Favereau 1989, 1997). 
All these conventionalist contributions relate the incompleteness of (labor) 
contracts and (legal) rules to the uncertainty and the impossibility to specify all 
future situations in contracts. In principle, this is the perspective not only on 
contracts but on written law in general.9 
2.2  Endogenizing Law  
The next argument builds up on the first one: from the standpoint of EC institu-
tions – as law – are not regarded as external constrains for individuals’ actions. 
Instead, institutions are regarded as “endogenous” to action. That means insti-
tutions are interpreted and enacted by actors in situations (Bessy 2002, 2011; 
Diaz-Bone 2009a; Salais 1998, 2007). This is the only kind of reality they 
possess and being mobilized by actors they are perceived to have “impact on 
their own.” And, of course, institutions as law are not totally flexible for any 
interpretation, but interpretation has to be applied to complete them and to put 
them into practice. 
Meanwhile, there are two collections of EC published which present this 
pragmatical approach to the analysis of law and its institutions (see Favereau 
2010; Bessy et al. 2011). 
One has to note […], that it is the legal rules itself, which require efforts for un-
derstanding and interpretation from the persons for whom the rules are made. To 
                                                             
9  It is necessary to be aware of the difference between institutions and conventions. See 
Salais (1998) and Diaz-Bone (2012). 
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the extent, in which legal statements have a general character, actors – who 
have to have to apply them – often have to determine which precise actions have 
to be exerted to be in accordance with these rules. They have to find out which 
practical meaning is to be given to legal rules in everyday life. Although the lit-
eral meaning of legal rules is hardly understandable, law always entails a part of 
incompleteness, imprecision and ambiguity (this to the extent in which law 
avoids to enumerate criteria or limits, which determine the legal or illegal 
character of a fact). […] The majority of legal texts cannot be regarded as pre-
scriptions for immediate executable actions. Instead, they offer principles and 
this is the reason why they need to be translated into the practical context. There-
fore, actors conceive legal rules as something whose meaning can be negotiated. 
Because of a missing agreement about the meaning of the legal rule, the chance 
to achieve collective action is undermined. The tenor of this agreement about 
how to interpret these texts is necessarily influenced by actor’s ideas, values and 
interest, who realized these agreements (Bessy et al. 2011, 17).10 
This “mobilization” of institutions is done by relating them to a given constel-
lation of conventions which are present as a plurality of possible logics of 
coordination. But the relation between law and collective action (and economic 
coordination) is more complex, because there is no one-way causality assumed 
in EC. As Claude Didry (2002) has shown, local collective agreements (in 
French conventions collectives) between workers and industrial entrepreneur in 
the Paris Region (in the 1930s) have induced debates between parliamentarian 
and lawyers. Afterwards, labor law was changed – the form of collective con-
tracts was introduced into French labor law as a legal form (which was former-
ly not known in France with its liberal and individualistic law tradition on 
which the Civil Code is based). And the other way round: legislation and legal 
categories co-evolved with the emergence of social groups which were not pre-
existing. Social actors had to make sense of new legal categories and legal 
forms. Robert Salais, Nicolas Baverez and Bénédicte Reynaud (1999) showed 
in their historical reconstruction of the social category of unemployment how 
new categories, new labor law and industrial labor organizations (which is the 
oppositional category to continuous work) co-emerged and actors had to adapt 
to this co-construction of this upcoming constellation of new forms of labor 
organization and legal categories. Claude Didry (2012, 2013) has coined the 
notion of “social questioning” to characterize the complex pragmatic relation-
ship between legal forms and upcoming needs in new situations. French work-
ers questioned the labor law of the Code Civil (including the labor contract 
between individuals, not collectives) and existing labor conventions as inap-
propriate to meet the new need of the coordination of new (historical) situations 
of emerging industrial labor relations. Existing rules, conventions and laws 
were made explicit and were put in question, so actors had to find solutions 
sometimes in conflicting situations as in lawsuits (Didry 2002, 2013, 2015 in 
                                                             
10  Translation by the author. 
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this HSR Special Issue). It is evident for EC that the analysis of law cannot be 
reduced to the internal analysis of its written juridical texts. The genuine prag-
matic approach of EC focuses instead on (new) coordination problems and on 
what economic actors do with it in historical situations. 
2.3  Investments in Forms 
Related to the argument of the necessity to endogenize the analysis of law is 
the argument to include the analysis of investment in forms. Legal categories 
and categories that are included in processes of legislation have been an object 
of study for EC for decades – especially socio-professional categories (Salais et 
al 1999; Desrosières and Thévenot 2002; Judde and Hanne 2011; Amossé 
2013). Eymard-Duvernay and Thévenot started in the early 1980s to apply the 
concept of investment in forms to theorize the socio-cognitive establishment of 
forms to which evaluation and coordination are related (Eymard-Duvernay and 
Thévenot 1983a, 1983b; Thévenot 1984). To achieve stabilized forms of (eco-
nomic) coordination, actors also have to invest in this kind of socio-cognitive 
environments of “forms” and actors have to bring the relevant information into 
those forms (to “in-form”), which are different depending on the different con-
ventions as logics of coordination.  
Legal categories such as: “employer,” “employee,” “unemployed,” and many 
others are categories which are established not only as legal, juridical or legiti-
mate, but as categories whose scope is enforced by law, which means by the 
State. Since the 1970s, Pierre Bourdieu and Luc Boltanski have pointed to the 
important role of law for the hedging and the back-up of professional catego-
ries (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1975). (Bourdieu and Boltanski do not belong to 
the scientific movement of EC, but they trained the founders of this approach 
and Boltanski cooperated closely with them.) 
In the process of social coding, words have practical impacts (this is the defi-
nition of law). If, in the establishment of the definition of a profession, a word 
is lost, then there will be effects. For example, a certain unwanted task will not 
be fulfilled or, vice versa, one cannot perform certain tasks one wants to exert. 
[…] Because social terminology (names of classes, occupations etc.) is the ob-
ject and the instrument in the symbolic fights between the classes for the defi-
nition of the social world – that means for the definition of social categories 
and therefore for social gradation and degradation – it belongs […] to the 
sphere of official terms, i.e. to law (Bourdieu and Boltanski 1975, 107; em-
phasis in original).11 
As Bourdieu (2014) has argued, the final foundation for categories and law is 
the State itself. This institution definitively has the final symbolic power to 
establish and to enforce legal categories as social forms. But as conventional-
                                                             
11  Translation by the author. 
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ists have argued, there must be an underlying general principle to establish 
forms, which is a convention.12 Alain Desrosières has labeled these conventions 
“conventions of equivalence”, which are principles that make possible to relate 
different forms and categories to each other and which enable actors to evaluate 
and construct “worth” to actors, objects, events and processes – this is the 
argument of Boltanski and Thévenot (2006). 
The notion of ‘investments of form’ stresses the treatment of persons and 
things in forms or formats that help maintain them at a certain level of gener-
ality by establishing equivalences. In such cases, general characterizations, 
classifications, and standards are envisaged in material terms on the basis of 
costly operations that give form to persons and things and facilitate – for a 
price – subsequent coordinations that rely on these being in ‘in good form’. 
On the model of a productive investment, the actors expect to receive a benefit 
in exchange consisting in ease of coordination. Investments of form are differ-
entiated according to the extension of the scope of validity, in time or space, 
of the establishment of equivalence, and also according to consistency of the 
material support by which the equivalence is sustained (Boltanski and Thé-
venot 2006, 359). 
For Desrosières, the establishment of conventions of equivalence is the core 
resource for the nation building in France (Desrosières 2002). His analysis 
demonstrates how the scope of forms is extended to the geographic frontiers of 
France, thereby forming the unity of this nation, which Desrosières has called 
“adunation” (Desrosières 2002).13 The methodologically important aspect here 
is that, for EC, the methodological terms of levels for the explanation of social 
phenomena are marginal. Here, EC is positioned in contrast to methodological 
individualism or methodological holism (Diaz-Bone 2011). Instead, concepts 
as investment in forms can be applied to explain why economic coordination is 
not restricted to the moment and the situation of interacting individuals. For 
EC, coordination can have an enormous scope in space ad time as Salais, Bave-
rez and Reynaud demonstrated discovering the evolution of the form of unem-
ployed and continuously employed industrial workers (Salais et al. 1999). In 
the case of this study, the scope reached round about hundred years in time and 
the whole French territory in space. Recently, Claude Didry worked out the 
concept of investment in forms and conceived law as a public investment in 
form.14 So, scope is EC’s alternative concept to the concept of levels.15 
                                                             
12  See for the consideration of “state conventions” Salais and Storper (1997), Salais (2007, 
2013), Didry (2002) and the contributions of Claude Didry (2015) and Frédéric Marty (2015) 
(in this HSR Special Issue). 
13  See also the contributions in Affichard (1977, 1987). 
14  See also Didry 2015, (in this HSR Special Issue). 
15  In fact EC collapses these levels which are so important for other institutionalist approaches. 
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2.4  The Plurality of Law Professional Organizations 
Forms do enlarge the scope of convention-based coordinations. There is anoth-
er concept which was used to explain this enlargement. Christian Bessy has 
highlighted the role of lawyers who endogenize law in their tasks of counseling 
and representing their client. Bessy and other representatives of EC have ana-
lyzed lawyers and their firms as “law intermediaries” (intermédiaires du droit) 
who transmit logics of coordination and conventions.16 In an empirical study, 
different types of lawyers, their corresponding organizational forms and per-
ceptions of qualities were identified by researchers of EC (Favereau 2010; 
Bessy 2010, 2012).17 
Indeed each case evokes a different perception of quality by the client: in-
spired quality (client’s expectations centered on creativity), industrial quality 
(client’s expectations based on efficiency), market (or merchant) quality (cli-
ent’s expectations centered on obtaining the international standard at the best 
cost), civic quality (client’s expectations related to a certain vision of general 
interest expressed by lawyer), domestic quality (client’s expectations related 
to his confidence in the lawyer’s ability to handle his personal file completely) 
(Bessy 2012, 26-7; emphasis in original). 
These four identified qualities correspond to specific organizational forms 
(Bessy 2012, 27). The traditional lawyer acts for clients (mostly private per-
sons) in simple legal matters (“traditional litigation lawyer”). The cause lawyer 
deals with specific lawsuits for which he is regarded as expert. Both kinds of 
lawyers decide themselves how to proceed (“cause lawyer”). The other two 
organizational forms (“haute couture-firm” and “standard firm”) can be charac-
terized by the cooperation between lawyers and their clients in the decision 
process how to conduct the lawsuit and how to develop a strategy for it. In 
many cases experts – who are not lawyers – are called in. Big companies which 
are specialized in juridical counseling (so-called law firms) entertain groups of 
lawyers and experts (they can realize both organizational forms). In figure 1 
these different organizational forms are grouped according to two main opposi-
tions and they are related to the four corresponding conventions. 
                                                             
16  See for further roles of intermediaries the contributions in Bessy et al., eds (2011) and Bessy 
(2015, in this HSR Special Issue). 
17  Bessy has also studied the different convention-based forms of labor contracts (Bessy 2007) 
and different practices of dismissal (Bessy 1993). One can consider these also as mediating 
forms to enhance the scope of conventions. And these contracts are embedded in process of 
recruiting as EC has studied in detail (Eymard-Duvernay and Marchal 1997; Marchal and 
Rieucau 2010). 
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Figure 1:  Quality Convention of Legal Services 
   
Source: Bessy (2012, 30). 
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important difference to Austin’s concept of speech acts. Law therefore can be 
understood as an investment in form with highest validity and stability (Thévenot 
1992, 1286). But juridical statements – as everyday speech acts – have to be built 
up on qualification processes of persons, objects, events, actions. In the theoreti-
cal context of EC, the term of qualification has a specific meaning: to attribute 
worth (Storper and Salais 1997; Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). Afterwards, it is 
possible for concepts as “facts of a case” to enter into the juridical discourse. 
The judge has to qualify the factual situation, i.e. to select and format the rele-
vant (from relevare: raise up) evidence to state that a certain regulation ap-
plies. Similarly, human and non-human entities have to qualify for a conven-
tional order of worth for their being involved in this convention of 
coordination which is thus a convention of quality. This is the way EC’s real-
istic approach to coordination is based on the shaping of the material envi-
ronment, and not limited to values or argued discourse (Thévenot 2012, 5; 
emphasis in original). 
Juridical processes which “apply” law can be understood as interpretative pro-
cesses which have to generate a generalizable situation in which a coherence of 
its relevant elements is realized. The coherence is structured by a compromise 
of a plurality of conventions – relevant objects, events and qualifications reflect 
this compromise. Thereby a collective cognition of the ethical justness (justice) 
and formal correctness (justesse) of the ongoing process and the generated 
juridical judgments can be the outcome.18 Collective cognition is a process 
which is “distributed,” this distributed cognition is not realized in an individual 
mind but is accomplished in the situation (and its continuations) itself.19  
3.1  EC and Discourse 
The analysis presented in “On justification” can also be seen as a kind of prag-
matical discourse analysis. But both authors have insisted on the important role of 
objects and cognitive forms – both are of a substance and reality which is non-
discursive. The consequence is that orders of justification (and conventions) 
cannot be reduced to discourse and to a discursive reality. For EC, this is evident.  
What is not evident for EC is the relation of conventions on the one side and 
discourses, discursive orders and discursive structures as cognitive structures 
on the other side.20 This is astonishing because of the presence of the works of 
Michel Foucault in France, who introduced a strong notion of discourse prac-
                                                             
18  From a conventionalist perspective this similarity (assonance) between the French words 
“justice” and “justesse” is not an accidental one. The contributions in Boltanski and Thévenot 
(1989) present (empirical) examples how the normative foundations of coordination have 
two sides at once: an ethical side and a “technical” side. Both have a practical dimension. 
19  EC has adopted the concept of distributed cognition from Edwin Hutchins (1995). 
20  One exception has to be mentioned. Pierre-Yves Gomez (1994, 1996) combined EC with 
Michel Foucault’s notions of discourse and dispositive. But Gomez developed his own notion 
of convention and is (still) not well-recognized or discussed by other representatives of EC. 
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tice and who related it also to non-discursive practices, thereby combining 
structuralism and pragmatism as EC does (Foucault 1970, 1972).21 
Only some years ago, François Eymard-Duvernay referred to the necessary 
role of language as basis for calculative practices. He introduced the concept of 
discursive practices into the analysis of economic (calculative) procedures. For 
Eymard-Duvernay, the establishment of conventions is grounded on language 
use (Eymard-Duvernay 2009). There are some more works which rely on EC 
and regard language use and discursive practices as fundamental for the social 
construction of economic worth, economic categories and economic coordina-
tion (Diaz-Bone 2009c, 2013; Judde de Larivière and Hanne 2011; Mützel 
2009, 2013).22  
One could add here the work of David Stark (2009). He combined the ap-
proach of a plurality of orders of worth (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) with his 
concept of heterarchy (as coexistence of multiple evaluative principles) to 
analyze complex processes of (re)organization (Stark 2009, xvii). Stark brings 
in the notion of a “discursive pragmatism”.  
Success requires attention to the structure of temporal processes. I refer to a 
collective sense of rhythm and timing – of when to make temporary settle-
ments to get the job done, with the knowledge that this is not a once-and-for-
all resolution of the disagreements – as a discursive pragmatism. Heterarchy is 
neither harmony nor cacophony but an organized dissonance (Stark 2009, 27; 
emphasis in original). 
Stark stresses the role of discursive practices for coordination and for the mobi-
lization of a “collective intentionality” (Searle) to realize coordination under 
conditions of heterarchy. 
Studying unemployment, Emmanuelle Marchal, Delphine Remillon and 
François Eymard-Duvernay analyzed unemployed persons in different labor 
worlds by applying lexicometric and discourse analytic tools (Marchal and Re-
millon 2012; Eymard-Duvernay and Remillon 2012). All of these recent works 
have identified deep structures in discourses which can be regarded as conven-
tions (or as orders of justification). So one main concept – conventions as logics 
of coordination in situations – has another form of appearance: it is like a water-
mark in discourses, that is a deeper structure in collective knowledge. Con-
ceived in this way, conventions can be regarded as socio-cognitive structures in 
discursive orders where they have a durable existence – overarching situations 
in time and space. 
                                                             
21  See the contributions in Historical Social Research 33 (1), “Discourse Analysis in the Social 
Sciences” (Bührmann et al. 2008). Foucault’s theory and his contribution to sociology of law 
have been discussed by scholars of law sciences. See Golder and Fitzpatrick (2009, 2010), 
Ewald (1990), Turkel (1990), Hunt (1992), Tadros (1998) and Valverde (2010). 
22  See also the contribution from Robert Salais (2015) on language use in neoliberalism in this 
HSR Special Issue. See Favereau (2013) for the interpretation of economics as language use. 
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3.2  Worlds of Law 
Claude Didry has worked out a pragmatist sociology of law which includes 
classical positions of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. The study “Naissance 
de la convention collective” (Didry 2002) represents an innovative contribution 
of EC to an “economic sociology of law” (Swedberg 2002, 2003; Ford and 
Swedberg 2009). Didry applies considerations from the field of sociology of 
law to the pragmatic analysis of economic law. Didry goes beyond the classical 
positions and his work can be regarded as the most advanced form of discourse 
analysis of law processes and of worlds of law. He introduces the concept of 
“production of law” and he speaks of “juridical work” (Didry 2002, 14, 27). 
This work is done by a multiplicity of actors at different stages of juridical 
practice. Different actors (persons, groups, and organizations) are involved in 
the processes of pre-wording, negotiations and elaboration of laws. These dif-
ferent actors induce a plurality of discursive positions and “registers of argu-
mentation” (Didry 2002, 124). From Didry’s perspective, jurisprudence (as 
science of law) neglects this engagement of different actors in the production of 
law and law interpretation. Also, in jurisprudence, it is neglected that there is a 
difference between the “legislative body” and the “factual social reality.” The 
State is a producer of juridical norms and law itself can be understood as the 
presence of the State in the sphere of economic actions (Didry 2002, 32). But for 
Didry, the State is not a coherent system and cannot be attributed to the idea of 
State as a system of norms as it is done in the tradition of law positivism of Hans 
Kelsen (1960). Instead, state-run commissions and nongovernmental commis-
sions, employers’ associations, unions, law scientists, social movements, NGOs 
and private companies are involved in the complex process of designing, enacting 
and implementing laws. For Didry, it is of interest how law is produced in de-
tail, what is its practical meaning that is situated in historical and pluralistic 
constellation of worlds of law. Worlds of law are built up out of conceptions 
how to interpret institutions of law and out of practices how lawsuits are pro-
cessed (Didry 2002, 32). Worlds of law can be conceived – like orders of justifi-
cation (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) or worlds of production (Storper and Salais 
1997) – as possible “cultural logics,” as “law cultures” which work as the founda-
tion of how judges, lawyers, law scientists (“law professors”) understand their 
way of acting and how they can legitimate it. Worlds of law are used by actors to 
criticize other law worlds. Institutions of law can only exist, when they are able to 
repel criticism coming from other possible worlds of law and able to generate 
compromises between worlds of law (Didry 2002, 38). 
Didry identified two main oppositions by which six possible worlds of law 
can be systematized.23 The first one represents the degree of formalization of 
                                                             
23  Didry’s identification of worlds of law is inspired by Michael Storper’s and Robert Salais’ 
concept of worlds of production and his methodology is influenced by their way to identify 
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law. This dimension reflects the intensity which is drawn on forms by the prac-
tice of law and separates itself from ethical aspects. The practice of law can be 
characterized as “formal” if it refers to forms of law. It is “material” if it refers 
to social norms. The second dimension catches the amount of rationalization of 
law. This is the degree of logical-deductive systematization and codification of 
law. The second dimension represents the juridical treatment of an individual 
case can be “deduced” out of general laws – this practice could be called “ra-
tional.” One could call a practice of law “irrational” if jurisdiction is based on 
specific lawsuits and related to specific situations. Figure 2 positions the worlds 
of law in a two-dimensional space.  
Figure 2:  Possible Worlds of Law 
Source: Didry (2002, 39), Didry (2013, 68). 
 
Didry scrutinized the different registers of arguments and different discourses 
in these six worlds. He could track different strategies of law production and 
law interpretation applying his concept of worlds of law. In all six worlds of 
                                                                                                                                
them (Storper and Salais 1997). One could characterize his worlds of law as ideal types in 
the sense of Max Weber’s methodology. 
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law the concept of law, the relevant actors, the dominant principles and its 
procedures differs.24 
4.  Conclusion 
The French approach of economics of conventions (EC) has contributed a huge 
amount of research to the analysis of economic law. This research on law is 
integrated in the broader institutionalist perspective of EC. There are two inno-
vative aspects which were discussed in this article. (1) Because EC differenti-
ates between institutions (as law) and the pragmatic, collective logics of their 
usages (as conventions and orders of justification) EC focusses in an innovative 
way on actors’ strategies how law is conceived, worded, implemented, inter-
preted an enacted. Law as an institution, therefore, is understood as endogenous 
to collective action and coordination. And the pragmatics of “law in action” is 
situated by EC into situations which are structured by actors’ competences and 
a plurality of conventions actors have to handle and can refer to. EC’s strategy 
of endogenizing law into such a plurality represents a pragmatic model of a 
“legal pluralism”.25 (2) EC offers new perspectives for a pragmatical form of 
discourse analysis that integrates discursive practices into the analysis of eco-
nomic law, its production, application and meaning. The article has argued 
(thereby referring to the work of Didry) that EC has found a way to avoid the 
purely internal analysis of law which is the “discourse analysis” of written 
tests. Instead EC studies legal discourses as ongoing social practices in the 
legal production. EC also avoids a purely external analysis of law which would 
ignore the (although incomplete) content and form of law itself. But still the 
notion of discourse and the discourse analytic perspective within EC can and 
should be more developed as it is so far.  
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